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The exact nature of the human will is, like the nature of human consciousness, a question so subjective and so
interior that no one is ever likely to arrive at a satisfactory judgment about how it functions or even what it iswhich may be the best proof that philosophy is not a science, and the best evidence that those social sciences
which try to measure, quantify, and control aspects of human consciousness are not sciences either. Still, there
is no denying that we are aware of a power or an impulse within us which transJates thought into action, or at
least responds ·to perceptions of threat or opportunity. So even if we have difficulty in defining the will, most
of us can acknowledge that there is something like that at work as part of human consciousness. [excerpt]
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Freedom of the Will

Allen C Guelzo

of the human will is, like the nature of human consciousness, a question so subjective and so interior that no one is ever
likely to arrive at a satisfactory judgment about how it functions or even
what it is-which may be the best proof that philosophy is not a science,
and the best evidence that those social sciences which try to measure,
quantify, and control aspects of humap consciousness are not sciences either. Still, there is no denying that we are aware of a power or an impulse
within us which transJates thought into action, or at least responds ·to
perceptions of threat or opportunity. So even if we have difficulty in
defining the will, most of us can acknowledge that there is something like
that at work as part of human consciousness.
What may be easier than defining this will is ascertaining whether it is
free. At the same time that we are conscious of possessing a will, we are
also conscious that this power, except in cases of mental illness, is not random. It is, after all, our will that we subjectively sense at work. So we might
be able to say that, simply by virtue of its being a process that originates within ourselves, willing is free-free from external constraint, free
because it belongs to us and not to someone else, free because nothing we
sense subjectively seems to intervene between a desire for something and
our reaching outward to satisfy that desire. Unless, of course, another desire intervenes-at which point we immediately realize that the transition
from desiring to willing is not quite so simple as we thought. And as soon
as we have recognized that, we are likely to acknowledge the operatipn of
our wills is affected by our habits, our temperament, and our exteriQr circumstances. We might desire A, only to find out that B is equally attractive:
which desire does the will obey? If the will "obeys" desires, is it still free?
If it does not, it might be free, but then it will be unpredictable-something
which the bulk of experience testifies against-or perhaps influenced by
factors outside our consciousness, in which case our will seems hardly to
belong to us anymore and can't be considered free after all. At this moment, we will recollect that we never actually defined what we meant by
free, either, so that we are unsure, not only of how the will is working, but
of what we mean by a free will. But unsure or not, we cannot avoid these
THE EXACT NATURE
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problems, because knowing whether the will is free is involved in a series
of practical and unavoidable questions:

How do we hold people accountable for their actions if their wills are
not free?
How can people be considered politically free within a polity if they do
not possess freedom of will?
How is it possible to understand the relationship of cause and effect if
the human will has the power to rise above causality and act freely? (And
if it cannot . .. return to the first question).
How can there be a God (or at least a God worthy of the name) unless
he controls a/] events? But if he does, how can human choices be free? If
he only controls some events, does he really control any? In either case,
what incentive is there for obedience, prayers, petitions, and worship?
If a God does not control all events, who (or what) does? If there is no
such control, are all events (including the operation of the human will)
random? If they are, what's the po~nt of doing anything at all?
Jonathan Edwards turned to the problem of the will in the 1740s with
many of these questions in mind. Behind him was a long tradition of
scholastic reasoning on the subject which he read as an undergraduate at
Yale, plus the legacy of the Calvinist theology which had entered like iron
into his soul. Around him was a bewildering new world of philosophical
inquiry, defined by the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century
and its Enlightenment popularizers, that opened up entirely new and uncomfortable trains of reasoning both for and against free will. Liberty
was the byword of the Enlightenment-liberty from the shackles of the
scholastic past, liberty from the dominance of theology, liberty from inherited, unearned, and unnatural status-and free will would become its
moral corollary. Edwards would not be the only Calvinist, or theologian,
or moralist, or American, to take on the subject, but he would become
the most famous to challenge the inroads of a fashionable free-willism
in the New England churches he loved and served. He would devote his
single most sustained piece of·philosophical and theological inquiry to it
in Freedom of the Will (1754), where he would bend his energies to two
tasks: uhdermining the notion that the human will possesses some sort of
unique autonomy, or "self-determination," and showing that a universe
in which all events have been determined by God is not inconsistent with
human liberty or moral accountability.

It is hard to date exactly when questions about free will emerged as an
independent discussion of their own. Both Plato and Aristotle were aware
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that the movement from thinking to doing was neither direct nor simple (as
in the so-called Medean paradox: I see the good but do the evil), and Aristotle in particular was conscious of the logical irreconcilability of an action
and its possible alternatives. (There will either be a naval battle or there
will not be a naval battle today, Aristotle pointed out; it can't be both, so it
is necessary that there be either one or the other). Similarly, thinkers as far
removed as the unnamed Hebrew author of Job, and the Roman Stoic
Seneca understood that the power of divine providence posed a genuine
difficulty to all who supposed that their actions originated solely in his own
will. But the idea that the will was a sort of separate power, or faculty, of
its own within the human psyche, and that it might possess a role (and a
freedom) in human decision making quite apart from the other faculties,
really originates with the Christian Augustine. "I knew I had a will [voluntas] as surely as I knew I had life in me," Augustine wrote in his autobiographical Confessions, and this voluntas had sufficient power, not only to
stymy the decisions of the intellect, but to carry the person in an entirely
different direction. "I was held fast, not in fetters clamped upon me by another, but by my own will, which had the strength of iron chains." 1 This t;ealization accomplished two things: first, it identified love with the will, and
made the synthesis of loving/willing/desiring the superior of simple reason;
second, it encouraged submission to a completely sovereign God. This not
only discovered order in human experience by referring it to a totalizing
providential plan but also ended the sense of ennui and purposelessness
which pervades the atmosphere of late antiquity in the West (something
which showed up in spades in Augustine's great paean to God's direction
and control over human history, the Civitatis Dei).
No one in western Christendom could entirely tear loose from the overwhelming influence of Augustine's insistence on God's ultimate control of
human events. In fact, to suggest otherwise was to associate oneself with
pagan unbelievers like Lucretius, whose doctrine of the spontaneous and
uncaused "swerve" of matter seemed to put chance on the throne of the
universe. Not even the Protestant Reformation challenged the consensus
in western Christianity about divine sovereignty. John Calvin, who shared
Augustine's healthy respect for the power of the will and the undependability of the intellect, also insisted that "the will of God is the cause of all
things that happen in the world." As for the evil that is done in the world,
"these very things are the right and just works of God. " 2 Attempts by ·
Protestants to step out from under the shadow of God's predestination,
which the Dutch theologian Jacobus Arminius proposed in the early
1600s, were promptly and systematically slapped down by confessionalists and Puritans alike as a kind of theologicallese-majeste.
But even as Arminius was receiving his comeuppance at the Synod of
Dordt in 1619, a revolution in European thought was already swelling
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toward an eruption. The new scientific method proposed by Francis
Bacon, and the new scientific discoveries 'of Galileo and Newton, completely. rewrote the idea of providence by substituting for the intelligent
design of God the soulless and mechanical activity of physics. For the first
time in the West, unbelief rather then devotion became identified with the
denial of free will, and the activity of the will became merely the last act
in a rigid chain of physical causes. "Voluntary actions," wrote Thomas
Hobbes, "have all of them necessary causes, and are therefore necessitated," but by material substances, not God. 3
This set off an unseemly panic among the theologians, who regrouped
throughout the eighteenth century around a defense of free will, reasoning that if people really do possess a power of choosing freely, then not
everything is controlled by material cause-and-effect, and some room is
left in the universe for genuine and responsible activity by both God and
his creatures. Jonathan Edwards, who had graduated from Yale in 1720,
hoped that Puritan New England would be spared the plague of "Arminianism." He knew from his own youthful· experience what it was like to
be "full of objections against the doctrine of God's sovereignty," and he
also knew what it was like, once he had been genuinely converted, to receive "quite another kind of sense of God's sovereignty than I had then,"
so that it became "my delight to approach God, and adore him as a Sovereign God, and ask sovereign mercy of him" (16:791-92, 799).
But the blandishments of the new Arminianism crept in under the barred
gate even of New England Puritanism. Unsettled New England divines like
Boston's Charles Chauncy concluded that "Men ... can't be religious but
with the free Consent of their Wills; and this dm be gain'd in no Way but
that of Reason and Persuasion:" 4 Edwards had just betome pastor of a
small congregation in New York when Yale was rocked by the "Great
Apostasy"-the defection of seven of the Yale staff, including the rector, to
the Church of England and the new "Arminianism." In May 1724, Edwards was recalled to Yale as a tutor to fill the vacuum caused by the
"Arminian" scandal. But the "Arminian" influence proved exceedingly
difficult to root out. Edwards' health broke under the strain, and it must
have been with great relief that he received the call of the church in
Northampton, Massachusetts (where his grandfather Solomon Stoddard
was the senior pastor), to become the pastoral assistant in 1727, and then,
after Stoddard's death, in 1729, called again as senior pastor.
For the next twenty years, all explicit discussion of "Arminianism" disappears from Edwards' writings, but he remained vigilant against the
possibility of its appearance. In the fall of 1734, a "great noise" went up
in western Massachusetts "about Arminianism, which seemed to appear
with a very threatening aspect upon the interest of religion here" (3:148,
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16:50). The pastor of the church at Sunderland, William Rand, had been
rumored to be preaching "new notions as to the doctrine of justification," and Robert Breck, the new pastor of the church in Springfield,
was hailed before the regional ministerial association on suspicion of
"Arminianism." But Edwards' response as pastor in Northampton was
to begin preaching, not on predestination, but on justification. The results were two remarkable rekindlings of religious fervor in Northampton and western Massachusetts, first in 1734-35 and then again in the
wake of the New England tour of the intinerant Anglican maverick,
George Whitefield, in 1740-41. Edwards seized on these revivals as good
reasons "for Arminians to change their principles" and "relinquish their
scheme," since so much of the testimony of the spiritually awakened in
Northampton had rounded on "the doctrine of God's absolute sovereignty with regard to the salvation of sinners" (3:168, 503). But in the
public letter he wrote about the revivals for Thomas Prince's Christian
History in 1743 (3:544-57), it was the "very lamentable decay of religious affections" and not Arminianism which was Edwards' principal
concern to oppose.
It was only after the revivals had cooled and Edwards became embroiled in controversy with his own congregation over the terms of admission to communion that his attention began to turn to the project of
writing a book against the Arminians. He had been "engaged in studies
on the Arminian controversies and preparing to write something upon
them" as early as 1747, and as he told the Scots Presbyterian John Erskine in 1752, his intention from the first was "to write something
upon ... free will and moral agency" (16:491). Just how far his thinking
had gone appears in January 1750, when Edwards, having received a
question about free will from his former pupil Joseph Bellamy, wrote a
reply which contains the core of the argument he would later put into
fuller form in 1754 (16:318, 491).
The communion controversy, which ended in Edwards' dismissal
from Northampton in 1750, interrupted this "design of writing against
Arminianism." It also convinced Edwards that Arminianism had somehow been the real issue behind the contention over communion, thus
adding the fuel of personal humiliation to the fire of doctrinal conflict.
In his Farewell Sermon, Edwards warned the restless Northamptonites
that "Arminianism, and doctrines of like tendency" were "creeping into
almost all parts of the land." 5 In 1751 he was called as pastor and missionary to the mixed Indian and white congregation at Stockbridge operated by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in New England,
but he continued to fight the communion battle over his shoulder. In the
letter to the Northampton church that he appended to Misrepresentations
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Corrected and Truth Vindicated in 1752, Edwards declared that "it was
evident, that Arminianism, and other loose notions in religion" had
begu.l\ ''.to get some footing among you" (16:484). He told the Scots Presbyterian John Erskine just after the dismissal that he had discovered the
leaders of the movement against him "falling in In some essential things
with Arminians," while "four or five" of the ministerial council called to
approve the dismissal "have heretofore had the reputation of Arminians"
(16:353, 312).
There is, consequently, nothing surprising in finding that Edwards
had no sooner completed the elaborate self-defense of his position on communion in Misrepresentations Corrected than he was once more a~; work
"writing something on the Arminian controversy," especially on "the
nature of that freedom of moral agents, which makes them the proper
subjects of moral government, moral precepts, counsels, calls, motives,
persuasions, promises and threatenings, praise and blame, rewards and
punishments ... endeavoring also to bring the late, great objections and
outcries against the Calvinistic divinity, from these topics, to the test of
the strictest reasoning" (16:491). He must have worked with tremendous
speed and concentration, since the first draft was "almost finished" in
only seven months, and in mid-April1753, he forwarded "proposals for
printing by subscription something I· have been writing" to Thomas Foxcroft, a ministerial colleague in Boston who had agreed to act as his gobetween with the printer, Samuel Kneeland (16:593-94).
His patience was short. All during the summer and winter of 1753, Edwards had to cope with bouts of illness and political in-fighting while
managing the Stockbridge mission. He insisted to Foxcroft that the manuscript be printed "in the best character" Kneeland possessed, and when
Foxcroft failed to keep him updated about the manuscript's prospects,
Edwards wrote querulously to him, wanting "to know very much what is
become of it" (16:619). In March 1754, Foxcroft finally sent a description of the printing for Edwards to approve. But Edwards disliked "such
a small page as you mention, less than a psalter." He wanted "good white
paper and the printer's best types," and he could not resist sending Foxcroft a last-minute insertion and a correction (16:625).
The book was finally published in October 1754, under the title A
Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that
Freedom of Will, which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency,
Vertue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame. (For practical purposes, it would thereafter be known simply as Freedom of the
Will, or more simply as "Edwards on the Will"). Once the finished volume was in hand, Edwards was still unhappy with it. He composed a list
of errata for Kneeland and informed Foxcroft that Kneeland "binds the
books poorly. The covers are so apt to warp that they will warp as they
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lie upon the table" (16:655). Of the 298 subscribers (including booksellers) who paid to receive copies of Freedom of the Will, only seven
were from Northampton.

Edwards was not interested in writing a comprehensive, dispassionate survey of the entire problem of free will. What he really wanted to do was
much more specific, and that was to destroy Arminianism as a viable option and justify Calvinistic theism as the only way to understand the sovereignty of God. Both the critique of Arminianism and the model he offers
for understanding the justice of Calvinism are philosophically ingenioushis destruction of Arminianism is just as destructive when applied to almost any other version of libertarianism-and he certainly believed that
he was dealing with a question which went straight to the root of larger
problems in human self-identity and self-understanding. "The knowledge
of ourselves consists chiefly in right apprehensions concerning those two
chief faculties of our nature, the understanding and will," Edwards wrote
in the preface to Freedom of the Will (1:133). But his task in Freedom of
the Will is primarily apologetic and ethical rather than philosophical. He
wants people not to have a satisfying romp through the garden of ideas
but to become Calvinists.
The book divides into four "parts" and a conclusion. From the very
opening of the first "part," Edwards moves at once to seize the high
ground by offering a definition of the will which, if accepted by the unwary
reader, will function like the hook in a fish's mouth. "The will (without
any metaphysical refining) is plainly, that by which the mind chooses anything"; the will is, in fact, "the same as an act of choosing or choice"
(1:137). In other words, Edwards describes the will as something which
is analytically identical with the mental action of choosing, so that the
will does not exist as a separate mental department, capable of checking,
resisting, or amending what the intellect settles upon as its choice. "In
every act, or going forth of the will, there is some preponderation of the
mind, or inclination, one way rather than another" (1:140). Detach the
will from those "preponderations," and you would get absolutely nothing, rather than independent action. Where there is no choosing in the intellect, there is no willing.
This shifts the real attention away from the will itself and onto the intimate connection of the intellect and the will. As Edwards puts it, let a
motive appeal in any sort of way to the intellect, so that the motive appears as "the greatest apparent good" at that moment, and the will must
move into action at once to apprehend that "good." 6 Hence, Edwards
can say that any "motive, which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is
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the strongest, that determines the will" (1:140). Or, to put it more starkly,
one may as well say "that the will always is as the greatest apparent good
is" (1:142). The will, for Edwards, looks more like a highly fluid process
than a stand-alone faculty, less like a review board and more like the terminal point of an electric current in which a motive triggers the assent of
the intellect, and the will shifts into play. And his use of the term motive
makes it clear that what the mind saw as "good" was not always the
product of logic, reason, or deliberation.
This definition of the will gives it so little room for action that one
might justifiably complain that Edwards has made willing necessarywhich was the trump card Arminians in particular and free-willers in general liked to play, since necessity conjured up in the eighteenth-century
mind images of orreries, mechanical animals, and other machines, forcing
and grinding their helpless components into soulless patterns of activity.
That, Edwards admitted, was indeed one way of using the word, and implies "some supposed opposition made to the existence of the, thing spoken of, which is overcome, or proves in vain to hinder or alter it" (1:149).
Transferred to his definition of the will, it would make matters look as if
his motives dragged the kicking and screaming will into conformity with
their demands. But that was not the only possible meaning of necessity,
Edwards pointed out. There is such a thing as natural necessity, where
people are compelled to will contrary to their intellect; but there is also a
philosophical necessity, which "is really nothing else than the full and
fixed connection between the things signified by the subject and predicate
of a proposition, which affirms something to be true" (1:152). This is the
kind of connection which is expressed, for instance, by a geometric theorem, or the description of a historical fact, or anything that enjoys "a connection with something that is necessary in its own nature, or something
that already is, or has been; so that the one being supposed, the other certainly follows" (1:153-54). In this version of necessity, there is no kicking,
no screaming, no felt sense of force, but rather the logical and harmonious
process of moving from one logically connected proposition to another.
What Edwards is waiting to introduce is a subset of philosophical
necessity that he designates moral necessity, and that describes the same
sense of unresisting "connection and consequence," only this time arising
"from such moral causes, as the strength of inclination, of motives, and
the connection which there is in many cases between these, and such certain volitions and actions" (1:156). So, while we can deplore the intrusion
of natural necessity into the operation of the will with the same energy as
the Arminians, we can also insist on the perfect legitimacy of moral necessity, because moral necessity never involves "some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavor" (1:159). In fact, we can deploy the same
distinction, not just between kinds of necessity, but between kinds of
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necessity's opposite, which is ability. We possess natural ability when we
have the literal physical ability to carry out our volitions; moral ability
describes the possession of the moral wherewithal to carry them out,
since one might be in full possession of all the natural ability to perform
an action but lack the moral ability, due to the power of depraved habits
and inclinations, to raise a finger. "A woman of great honor and chastity
may have a moral inability to prostitute herself to her slave," Edwards
offered by way of example, while "a moral inability to love wickedness
in general, may render a man unable to take complacence in wicked persons or things" (1:160). Although both situations employed the Arminian bogey-words necessity and inability, in neither case was anyone being
forced, or deprived of freedom of action.
As Edwards closed the first "part" of Freedom of the Will, he had maneuvered the terminology in such a way as to disarm the Arminians even
before the battle was joined. The will was not an independent faculty
which possessed a liberty of its own ("That which has the power of volition or choice is the man or the soul, not the power for volition itself"
[1:163]). And freedom for the will meant, not the power of the will to
choose for itself, but "that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice." It mattered nothing to Edwards how the whole process was started-including if it originated in
divine decree. If there was natural ability available, "and nothing in the
way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will," then he was as perfectly free as anyone could desire (1:164).
It was now time, in the second "part," for Edwards to turn the weapons
he had seized on the epistemologically confused Arminians, and to that
end he began knocking over one Arminian objection to divine predestination after another. Did the Arminians believe that the will is an independent faculty which forms its own volitions? If this will decides on Z, then
there had to be a prior act of will in the will to make that decision wliich
we may call Y. But the same process by which Y called Z into action was
also required to get Y moving as well, thus requiring yet another act of
will, which we may call X, to causeY; and thus to infinite regress. Or if
infinite regress was not enough of a demonstration of Arminian folly, a
demonstration of Arminian logical incoherence would work too. "If the
will determines itself, then either the will is active in determining its volitions, or it is not," Edwards reasoned. "If it be active in it, then the determination is an act of the will; and so there is one act of the will determining another. But if the will is not active in the determination, then how
does it exercise any liberty in it?" (1:176).
Perhaps one could simply say that the will operates without causes, but
Edwards was only waiting to point out that uncaused volitions were
pretty much the same thing as chaos-and did the Arminians really want
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to suggest that we lived in a universe of chaos? "If we begin to maintain,
that things may come into existence, and begin to be, which heretofore
have not been, of themselves, without any cause; all our ... evidence of
the beiqg of God, is cut off at one blow" {1:181-83). In that case, pure,
raw chance would rule our affairs, and chance's rule would be no less absolute than that of God. On the other hand, if the Arminian should
hastily propose that the will is determined by the intellect, then what has
the Arminian said 'which differs from Edwards' Calvinism? "If it determines them by an act of the understanding, or some other power, then the
will don't determine itself; and so the self-determining power of the will
is given up" (1:191). In the last ditch, one could do as Dr. Johnson did
("We know our will is free and there's an end on't") and appeal to the felt
experience of choosing in spite of the intellect or a motive or a cause as a
demonstration of the will's freedom. But Edwards would have none of it.
Such an experience was illusory. It might be possible "for the understanding to act in indifference, yet to be sure the will never does; because
the will's beginning to act as if the very same as its beginning to choose or
prefer" (1:197). We can fool ourselves into believing that the will can do
something in spite of what the intellect says, but that will be true only if
the intellect is viewing the situation "remotely and generally." When you
actually come to "the last step," the very next thing to be determined "is
not what my mind is absolutely indifferent about" (1:202).
Edwards played cat-and-mouse like this with Arminianism all through
the second "part" of Freedom of the Will. But even Edwards had the sense
that he was shredding tissue paper rather than attacking the real core of the
Arminian persuasion, and that was the terror of mechanism and the fear
that determinism would cooperate with mechanism in tearing away every
ethical restraint from evil and every moral incentive to good by persuading
people that their actions were simply what they had to be. So in the third
"part," Edwards finally settled on the real question underlying the flight to
free will: is the Arminian notion of free will and self-determination actually
needed to ensure moral accountability, even if it is logically flawed? Is it really the case that "such kind of liberty" is "requisite to moral agency, virtue
and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment, etc." {1:277)?
Edwards replied with a mixture of theological and philosophical ripostes. God is good, Edwards asserted, and "not only virtuous, but a
being in whom is all possible virtue," to the point where he cannot do
evil. He is,, in other words, "necessarily holy, and his will necessarily determined to that which is good" (1:278). Yet, no one, even Arminians,
had ever expressed an anxiety that, because God's goodness is necessary,
it was unworthy of praise or considered as anything less than perfectly
holy. Why should ours, if it is under God's direction? Likewise, "it was
impossible, that the acts of the will of the human soul of Christ should,
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in any instance, degree or circumstances, be other wise than holy" -yet,
by Arminian logic, that made Christ merely a machine, and completely
lacking in the freedom necessary to being a genuine moral actor (1:281).
If necessity was good enough for Jesus Christ, why should those who,
like the Arminians, claim to be his disciples, complain?
It was Edwards' delight to remind the Arminian that the purpose of
moral law was not to create an environment where all were free to create
their own alternatives but "to bind to one side," to train people's responses to avoid some actions and do others. Allow the Arminian definition of free will as "indifference" to stand and we would have to say that
every law ever passed "destroys liberty; as it puts the will out of equilibrium." Wasn't it the most basic "end of commands ... to turn the will
one way" rather than another, and to cultivate a partiality for doing the
good, not to encourage it to gallop off madly in all directions (1:304)?
Ironically, any free-wilier who actually cultivated such an "indifference"
to having their will caused to do good was performing what any normal
person would consider the diametric opposite of virtue. "In order to the
virtuousness of an act," the Arminians must demand that "the heart ...
be indifferent in the time of performance of that act, and the more indifferent and cold the heart is with relation to the act which is performed, so
much the better; because the act is performed with so much the greater
liberty" (1:321). If this is what Arminians believed was the original moral
position, then no society could entertain much hope for a moral future.
To say, then, that people possess a moral inability to do good because of
their vicious habits or temperament gives them no excuse because somehow they could not cultivate an "indifference" to those habits or temperaments; to the contrary, a moral inability, "consisting in the strength of ...
evil inclination, is the very thing wherein ... wickedness consists" (1:309).
Whereas people possessed of moral ability to do good would normally be
the object of praise--except by Arminians, who would criticize them for
being machines. Better in this case to be a machine, Edwards drily remarked. "Machines are guided by an understanding cause, by the skillful
hand of the workman or owner," whereas among Arminians, "the will of
man is left to the guidance of nothing, but absolute blind contingence"
(1:371).
If the third "part" of Freedom of the Will was devoted to showing how
Arminian self-determination did nothing to promote the goal of moral
accountability, the fourth and last "part" had to bear the burden of
showing that Calvinism did. And to do that, Edwards needed to call on
the most important of the terms he had defined in the first "part," necessity. In the Calvinist universe, where God determined all things, every
human action was consequently necessary. The lexicon of eighteenthcentury philosophy was primed to regard anything which was necessary
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as lacking in moral content, because there were no real alternatives possible. But Edwards argued that necessity is not the enemy of virtue. Even if
virtuous acts proceed from an individual equipped by God with virtuous
dispositions, that did not destroy the virtue of the act itself. People have
the notion, Edwards complained, that necessity always means forcible restraint or armed compulsion. But he had demonstrated in the first "part"
that this was a "vulgar sense" of the term, and thata "metaphysical sense"
was "entirely diverse." And as soon as people thought one step above the
"vulgar," they would see that "the glorified saints have not their freedom
at all diminished, in any respect; and that God himself has the highest possible freedom ... and are so, for that very reason, because they are most
perfectly necessary."
If Arminians argued that Calvinism promoted fatalism, they were indulging in a post hoc, propter hodallacy, since there was no inherent tendency within Calvinism to produce,fatalism. If Arminians argued that
Calvinism made God the "author"' of evil, Edwards replied that they had
made a category error. God, according to Calvinism, was merely "the
permitter, or not a hinderer of.sin; and at the same time, a disposer of the
state of events, in such a manner, for wise, holy and most excellent ends
and purposes" (1:399). And if Arminians argued that Calvinism helped
to produce atheism, Edwards had no difficulty-based on what had happened in Northampton-in replying that "their doctrine," not his, "excuses all evil inclinations, which men find to be natural; because in such
inclinations, they are not self-determined." It was not among Calvinists
but among Arminians that the anxiety to get right with the eighteenthcentury haut monde was the more prevalent. Ever since Arminianism had
become the fashion, "vice, profaneness, luxury and wickedness of all sorts,
and contempt of religion, and of every kind of seriousness and strictness
of conversation" have begtm to "proportionably prevail" (1:468). As he
wrote to John Erskine three years later,
This doctrine of a self-determining will, as the ground of all morgl good and
evil, tends to prevent any proper exercise of faith in God and Christ, in the affair of our salvation, as it tends to prevent all dependence upon them. For, instead of this, It teaches a kind of absolute independence in all these things that
are of chief importance in this,affair; our righteousness, depending originally
on our own acts, as self-determined. (16:721-22)

To use a modern classification, Edwards was a compatibilist: liberty and
necessity are compatible with each other. But all the same, it was a compatibilism in which necessity clearly played the dominant role and liberty
served to explain necessity's operations. Stubborn Arminians would complain, he realized, that any idea of necessity, no matter how cleverly
phrased or deployed, still reduced people to ,the level of something like
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machines, and in the process, surrendered theism to the mechanism that
Enlightenment unbelief at its worst now espoused.

Freedom of the Will made a greater impact at first in Scotland than in
New England, where many of its readers, like James Dana of Wallingford, found the book simply incomprehensible. That opinion changed
abruptly after 1765, when Edwards' pupil, Samuel Hopkins, published
an attack on the New England church establishment, using Edwards'
doctrine of natural and moral ability to decry compromises New England
church leaders had made over the decades with the Puritan ideal of a
holy, gathered church. Freedom of the Will became the touchstone of the
antiestablishment New Divinity, and the entire free will argument became
the great issue of New England theology for a century after Edwards'
death. The book's celebrity eventually pushed it into the main currents of
American philosophy before the Civil War, and even the Civil War's president, Abraham Lincoln, "always hoped to get at President Edwards on
the Will. " 7
With the waning of the New England Theology in the later 1800s and
the rise of pragmatism, "Edwards on the Will" dropped back into a
philosophical limbo. Even sympathetic biographers, like Ola Elizabeth
Winslow in 1940 and Perry Miller in 1949, found that Freedom of the
Will's hammerlock obsession with strangling Arminian free-willism fit
poorly into the new narratives they constructed for Edwards' life and for
American intellectual history as the story of an es~pe from "the trammels of inability." Winslow conceded that Freedom of the Will was "an
amazing performance," in which Edwards' "dexterity in accomplishing
what at times appear to be logical impossibilities is thrilling to watch."
But in the end, Winslow concluded, that it was a "great polemic" rather
than a "great book," and "paralyzed debate when debate needed most to
be stimulated. " 8 Miller, likewise, hailed Freedom of the Will as "beyond
all peradventure ... [Edwards'] most sustained intellectual achievement,
the most powerful piece of sheer forensic argumentation in American literature." Even so, for Miller it seemed oddly out of place in a story where
Edwards figured as a frontier Niebuhr, calling down judgment on protocapitalist cupidity. It was not, after all, "so rich or human a book" as Edwards' writings on revival, and his arguments seemed "like a battleship
wasting broadsides on a flimsy target." 9
Perhaps because of these discouragements, perhaps because of the difficulties of tackling so mammoth an eighteenth-century philosophical
text, Freedom of the Will made only brief appearances in the central texts
on Edwards' theology and ethics by Conrad Cherry, Clyde Holbrook,
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and Roland Delattre. The publication in 1957 of Paul Ramsay's edition
of Freedom of the Will as the first volume of the Yale series of Edwards'
works was a turning point in the interpretation of the text. (Arthur E.
Murphy hailed it in a substantial and perceptive review essay in Philosophical Review as "an event of philosophical importance ... not merely
to early American but to contemporary philosophy. ")1° John E. Smith's
chapter on Freedom of the Will in Jonathan Edwards: Puritan, Preacher,
Philosopher (1992) offers one of the most extended rereadings of the
book in recent times.
Freedom of the Will still suffers among Edwardsean interpreters in almost inverse proportion to its importance in the Edwardsean canon. On
the other hand, the American philosophical climate has swung since
World War II substantially back in the direction of various forms of determinism. As in Edwards' day, the most recent forms of determinism
have been cast into the hardest and most mechanistic patterns, with
analogies to computers and computation replacing the eighteenth century's admiration for orreries and machines, while the most ambitious theistic and philosophical resistance to the new mechanism has resorted to
contingency and process theology (or "openness-of-God"). Perhaps a new
relevance may yet be found in Edwards' greatest work.
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